Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Private Information.
The authors examine equilibrium credit contracts and allocations under different competivity specifications, and explain the economic roles of collateral under these specifications. Both moral hazard and adverse selection are considered. The principal message is that how a competitive equilibrium is conceptualized significantly affects the characterization of equilibrium credit contracts. Specifically, some well known results in the rationing literature are shown to rest delicately on the adopted equilibrium concept. Two somewhat surprising results emerge. First, high-quality borrowers with unlimited collateral may be priced out of the market despite the bank having idle deposits. Second, high-quality borrowers may put up more collateral. Copyright 1987 by American Finance Association.
Year of publication: |
1987
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Authors: | Chan, Yuk-Shee ; Thakor, Anjan V |
Published in: |
Journal of Finance. - American Finance Association - AFA, ISSN 1540-6261. - Vol. 42.1987, 2, p. 345-63
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Publisher: |
American Finance Association - AFA |
Saved in:
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