Collective Choice and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
Some public goods are provided entirely with private contributions, others with a mixture of public and private funding, and still others are entirely publicly funded. In order to study this variation, a model of dual provision is developed that endogenizes public and private funding. Households vote over an income tax that finances public supply of the good and on whether to permit private contributions. While permitting private contributions may lead to a reduction in total provision, a majority always favors permitting private contributions. Results are developed for small and large economies, and the relevance of nonexcludability and noncongestion are investigated. Copyright 2003 By The Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.
Year of publication: |
2003
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Authors: | Epple, Dennis ; Romano, Richard |
Published in: |
International Economic Review. - Department of Economics. - Vol. 44.2003, 2, p. 545-572
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Publisher: |
Department of Economics |
Saved in:
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