Collective Incentives and Cooperation with Imperfect Monitoring
Year of publication: |
[2021]
|
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Authors: | Mengel, Friederike ; Weidenholzer, Simon ; Mohlin, Erik |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Kooperation | Cooperation | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Anreiz | Incentives | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (37 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 9, 2021 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.3823041 [DOI] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; H41 - Public Goods |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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