Collective moral hazard, maturity mismatch, and systemic bailouts
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Farhi, Emmanuel ; Tirole, Jean |
Published in: |
The American economic review. - Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Assoc., ISSN 0002-8282, ZDB-ID 203590-X. - Vol. 102.2012, 1, p. 60-93
|
Subject: | Finanzkrise | Financial crisis | Subprime-Krise | Subprime financial crisis | Bankgeschäft | Banking services | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Kapitalanlage | Financial investment | Fälligkeit | Maturity | Krisenmanagement | Crisis management | Systemrisiko | Systemic risk | Schuldenübernahme | Bailout | Bankenaufsicht | Banking supervision | Theorie | Theory | USA | United States |
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