Collective Wage Agreements on Fixed Wages and Piece Rates May Cartelize Product Markets
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Kirstein, Annette ; Kirstein, Roland |
Published in: |
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE). - ISSN 0932-4569. - Vol. 165.2009, 2, p. 250-259
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Extent: | text/html |
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Type of publication: | Article |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; J50 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining. General ; K31 - Labor Law ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices |
Source: |
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