Collusion Among Interest Grops: Foreign Aid and Rent Dissipation
Year of publication: |
1997-11-03
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Authors: | Svensson, Jakob |
Institutions: | Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES), Stockholms Universitet |
Subject: | game-theoretic model | public policy | developing country | government revenue | crowding out | foreign aid |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Published in Journal of International Economics, 2000, pages 437-461. The text is part of a series Seminar Papers Number 610 32 pages |
Classification: | O10 - Economic Development. General ; O19 - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations ; O20 - Development Planning and Policy. General |
Source: |
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