Collusion and budget distortions in hierarchical organizations
Year of publication: |
1996
|
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Authors: | Wessels, Joachim H. |
Published in: |
Firms, markets and contracts : contributions to neoinstitutional economics. - Heidelberg : Physica-Verl., ISBN 3-7908-0947-0. - 1996, p. 109-131
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Bürokratietheorie | Theory of bureaucracy | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory |
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