Collusion and renegotiation in hierarchies : a case of beneficial corruption
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | Olsen, Trond E. |
Other Persons: | Torsvik, Gaute (contributor) |
Published in: |
International economic review. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0020-6598, ZDB-ID 209871-4. - Vol. 39.1998, 2, p. 413-438
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Korruption | Corruption | Theorie | Theory |
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