Collusion and the Incentives for Information Sharing
Two steps are required for firms collusively to restrict output in stochastic markets. Firms must homogenize their market estimates by pooling information and they must cooperatively allocate production levels. In this article I examine the incentives for firms to share private information about a stochastic market. I show that there is never a mutual incentive for all firms in an industry to share unless they may cooperate on strategy once information has been shared. This situation is unfortunate, as society's welfare is maximized only when firms share information, but act competitively.
Year of publication: |
1983
|
---|---|
Authors: | Clarke, Richard N. |
Published in: |
Bell Journal of Economics. - The RAND Corporation, ISSN 0361-915X. - Vol. 14.1983, 2, p. 383-394
|
Publisher: |
The RAND Corporation |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Costs of Neutral/Unmanaged IP Networks
Clarke, Richard N., (2009)
-
Will asset-sharing improve wireless communications performance?
Clarke, Richard N., (2014)
-
Expanding mobile wireless capacity: The challenges presented by technology and economics
Clarke, Richard N., (2012)
- More ...