Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy : experimental evidence
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Aoyagi, Masaki ; Fréchette, Guillaume R. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 144.2009, 3, p. 1135-1165
|
Subject: | Gefangenendilemma | Prisoner's dilemma | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Experiment | Kartell | Cartel | Theorie | Theory |
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