Collusion, delegation and supervision with soft information
Year of publication: |
2003
|
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Authors: | Faure-Grimaud, Antoine ; Laffont, Jean-Jacques ; Martimort, David |
Published in: |
The review of economic studies. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 0034-6527, ZDB-ID 209928-7. - Vol. 70.2003, 2, p. 253-279
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Kontrolle | Control | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Organisationstheorie | Organization theory | Theorie | Theory |
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