Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring

This paper shows that a cartel that observes neither costs, prices, nor sales may still enforce a collusive agreement by tying each firm's continuation profit to the truncated current profits of the other firms. The mechanism applies to both price and quantity competition, and the main features are broadly consistent with common cartel practice identified by Harrington and Skrzypacz [24].

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Chan, Jimmy ; Zhang, Wenzhang
Published in:	Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 157.2015, C, p. 188-211
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Collusion \| Oligopoly \| Repeated game \| Private information \| Private monitoring

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L40 - Antitrust Policy. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263582