Collusion Inducing Taxation of a Polluting Oligopoly
Year of publication: |
2008
|
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Authors: | Benchekroun, H. ; Ray Chaudhuri, A. |
Institutions: | Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research |
Subject: | pollution tax | oligopoly | cartel formation | coalition formation | differential game |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series CentER Discussion Paper Number 2008-80 |
Classification: | H41 - Public Goods ; L51 - Economics of Regulation ; Q58 - Government Policy |
Source: |
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Collusion Inducing Taxation of a Polluting Oligopoly
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