Collusion, shading and optimal organization design in a three-tier agency model with a continuum of types
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Suzuki, Yutaka |
Published in: |
Annals of economics and finance. - Beijing : Peking University Press, ISSN 1529-7373, ZDB-ID 2097904-6. - Vol. 22.2021, 2, p. 317-365
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Subject: | collusion | supervision | mechanism design | First Order (Mirrlees) Approach | behavioral economics | shading | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection |
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