Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game

In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms that compete à la Cournot. It is shown how in the presence of detection lags optimal punishments fail to restore cooperation as long as the number of lags increases. Moreover, collusion sustainability is difficult to achieve also if the number of firms is low.

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Authors:	Ciarreta, Aitor ; Gutiérrez-Hita, Carlos
Published in:	Estudios de Economia. - Departamento de Economía. - Vol. 40, 2 Year 2013, p. 247-254
Publisher:	Departamento de Economía
Subject:	Optimal punishments \| detection lags \| collusion sustainability

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010735534