Collusive Effects of Vertical Restraints under Asymmetric Information
This paper points out that vertical delegation, implemented through the design of quantity discount contracts, may allow upstream producers, as well as downstream retailers, to achieve profits higher than those obtained under vertical integration or contracts based on price restrictions. Our result shows that when downstream competition is sufficiently tough, the design of suitable vertical restraints implements a market outcome closer to the monopoly benchmark, which has a detrimental effect on consumer surplus. Moreover, we argue that legally banning price restricting contracts is suboptimal, the reason being that they remove a double-marginalization effect created by asymmetric information between upstream producers and downstream retailers.
Year of publication: |
2004-01-01
|
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Authors: | Kastl, Jakub ; Piccolo, Salvatore |
Institutions: | Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) |
Saved in:
freely available
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