Combinatorial Clock Auctions: Price Direction and Performance.
This paper addresses three concerns with ascending price Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs); price guidance toward efficiency relevant packages, computational burden, and susceptibility to collusive bidding. We propose a descending price Combinatorial Clock Auction (DCCA) with a newly devised pricing strategy to alleviate all of these concerns. Mimicking bidding behavior of human subjects found in previous laboratory experiments, agent-based simulations of DCCA show improvements in efficiency resulting from better price guidance and a reduction in computational burden when compared to a CCA. In addition, we summarize evidence from previous literature that highlights the collusion resistance of descending price institutions.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Munro, David R. ; Rassenti, Stephen |
Institutions: | Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of Business and Economics |
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