Combining rational choice and evolutionary dynamics: The indirect evolutionary approach
In this study we propose a formal framework for the indirect evolutionary approach as initiated by Güth and Yaari (1992). It allows to endogenize preferences and to study their evolution. We define two-player indirect evolutionary games with observable types and show how to incorporate symmetric as well as asymmetric situations. We show how to apply solution concepts that are well known from game theory and evolutionary game theory to solve these games. For illustration we include two examples.
Year of publication: |
1999
|
---|---|
Authors: | Königstein, Manfred ; Müller, Wieland |
Institutions: | Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation ökonomischer Prozesse, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Why firms should care for customers
Königstein, Manfred, (2000)
-
Güth, Werner, (1999)
-
Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment
Anderhub, Vital, (1999)
- More ...