Comment la contractualisation dans les administrations fiscales peut-elle limiter la corruption et la fraude ? Le cas des douanes camerounaises. How Can Performance Contracts in Revenue Administrations Limit Corruption and Bad Practices? The Case of Cameroon Customs

This article examines the effects of the introduction of ?performance contracts? in customs, from an experiment launched in Cameroon Customs in 2008. This is an original example of reform which transposes elements of New Public Management in the specific context of an administration that made the fight against corruption its first goal to increase its effectiveness. The analysis is based on quantitative data to study changes in individual behaviors and their macro effects on the global efficiency of the administration. Qualitative data were also collected from 2008 to 2011. Measurable results are positive on revenue collection, bad practices reduction and customs clearance time. Nevertheless, evaluation and contracting raise questions on the civil servants? representations of their institution and the law.