Comment on Lsquo;Market Discipline and Monetary PolicyRsquo; by Carl Walsh

This paper shows that the results Walsh (2000, Market discipline and monetary policy, Oxford Economic Papers, 52, 249-71) obtains are highly sensitive to the assumption that different wage contracts are based on different information sets even though they are negotiated simultaneously. In particular, the power of future expectations to discipline an opportunistic central banker is much weaker when homogeneous information sets are used

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Year of publication:	[2010]
Authors:	Bugarin, o S.
Other Persons:	de Carvalho, a A. (contributor)
Publisher:	[2010]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Inflationserwartung \| Inflation expectations \| Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information \| Regelbindung versus Diskretion \| Rules versus discretion
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 57, Issue 4, pp. 732-739, 2005 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 2005 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development ; O47 - Measurement of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012760876