Commitment problem, optimal incentive schemes, and relational contracts in agency with bilateral moral hazard
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Suzuki, Yutaka |
Published in: |
Journal of international economic studies. - Tokyo, ISSN 0911-1247, ZDB-ID 1192531-0. - Vol. 21.2007, p. 103-124
|
Subject: | Anreiz | Incentives | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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