Commitment problem, optimal incentive schemes, and relational contracts in agency with bilateral moral hazard
Yutaka Suzuki
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | Suzuki, Yutaka |
Published in: |
Journal of international economic studies. - Tokyo, ISSN 0911-1247, ZDB-ID 11925310. - Vol. 21.2007, p. 103-124
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