Commitment Problems and War in International Bargaining

In the context of international bargaining, standard models predict that a shift in military power can cause preventive war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the only cause of war under commitment problems and that commitment problems per se are not necessarily a cause of war even if the relative bargaining position changes substantially.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Amann, Erwin ; Leonhardt, Nadine
Publisher:	Essen : Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
Subject:	bargaining \| commitment problems \| shifts in power

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Series:	Ruhr Economic Papers ; 403
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
ISBN:	978-3-86788-458-7
Other identifiers:	10.4419/86788458 [DOI] 737507705 [GVK] hdl:10419/70773 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:rwirep:403 [RePEc]
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292375