Commitment rather than independence : an institutional design for reducing the inflationary bias of monetary policy: a comment on Henrie͏̈tte M. Prast
Year of publication: |
1998
|
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Authors: | Haan, Jakob de |
Published in: |
Kyklos : international review for social sciences. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0023-5962, ZDB-ID 3292-X. - Vol. 51.1998, 1, p. 119-125
|
Subject: | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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