Commitment rather than independence : an institutional design for reducing the inflationary bias of monetary policy: reply to Jakob de Haan
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | Prast, Henriëtte Maria |
Published in: |
Kyklos : international review for social sciences. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0023-5962, ZDB-ID 3292-X. - Vol. 51.1998, 1, p. 127-128
|
Subject: | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Inflation | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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