Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions.
The authors model the behavior of a vote-maximizing legislator in order to predict interest group campaign contributions to incumbent politicians. They show that committee assignments and voter preferences affect the price a legislator requires to produce policies for any interest group. An econometric analysis of actual interest group contributions shows that these groups make significantly larger contributions to legislators on committees with jurisdiction over especially relevant policy issues and to incumbents with nonhostile constituencies. These results support the authors' theory; interest groups act as if committees matter in the determination of policy and voters' interests constrain interest group behavior. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
1991
|
---|---|
Authors: | Grier, Kevin B ; Munger, Michael C |
Published in: |
Economic Inquiry. - Western Economic Association International - WEAI. - Vol. 29.1991, 1, p. 24-43
|
Publisher: |
Western Economic Association International - WEAI |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Allocation Patterns of PAC Monies: The U.S. Senate.
Grier, Kevin B, (1990)
-
Coates, Dennis, (1995)
-
Dougan, William R, (1989)
- More ...