Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains
Year of publication: |
2023
|
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Authors: | Roy, Souvik ; Sadhukhan, Soumyarup |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 209.2023, p. 1-40
|
Subject: | Committee formation under constraints | Ontoness | Random dictatorial rules | Random social choice function | Strategy-proofness | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences |
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