Committees, sequential voting and transparency
We propose a model of sequential voting in committees, where members use their individual votes to signal high efficiency in their bid to become re-appointed. Transparency precludes efficient information aggregation, and thus decreases the utility of the principal in the first period; it may be beneficial to her in the second period. Under transparency, equilibria under sequential voting always differ from those under simultaneous voting and may lead to more or less efficient information aggregation.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Hahn, Volker |
Published in: |
Mathematical Social Sciences. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896. - Vol. 56.2008, 3, p. 366-385
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Committees Information aggregation Transparency Voting Sequential voting |
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