Common Agency Games with Common Value Exclusion, Convexity and Existence
We consider the model common agency proposed by Biais Martimort and Ro- chet (2000, 2013). We show that in this setting there is no symmetric equilibrium as the one characterized in those articles. We argue that the equilibrium price sched- ules cannot be simultaneously convex and concave. In particular in the monopoly case, under some classical assumptions, some agents will be excluded from trade. In the other that a price schedule at any symmetric equilibrium must be must be convex and concave. We conclude that a symmetric equilibrium cannot exist and discuss the implications of our result and the links with the existing literature.
Year of publication: |
2014-07-15
|
---|---|
Authors: | Piaser, Gwenaël |
Institutions: | Institut de Préparation à l'Administration et à la Gestion (IPAG) |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Incentive compatible mechanisms in multiprincipal multiagent games
Piaser, Gwenaël, (2014)
-
Competing Mechanisms Communication under Exclusivity Clauses
Attar, Andrea, (2014)
-
Linear Prices Equilibria and Nonexclusive Insurance Market
Loss, Frédéric, (2014)
- More ...