Communication and the Beliefs of Economic Agents
Year of publication: |
September 2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Candia, Bernardo |
Other Persons: | Coibion, Olivier (contributor) ; Gorodnichenko, Yuriy (contributor) |
Institutions: | National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor) |
Publisher: |
2020: Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research |
Subject: | Kommunikation | Communication | Erwartungsbildung | Expectation formation | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource illustrations (black and white) |
---|---|
Series: | NBER working paper series ; no. w27800 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Mode of access: World Wide Web Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers |
Other identifiers: | 10.3386/w27800 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
-
Bayesian persuasion and information design
Kamenica, Emir, (2019)
-
Does communication increase the precision of beliefs?
Bruttel, Lisa Verena, (2024)
-
Learning and experimentation in strategic bandit problems
Klein, Nicolas Alexandre, (2010)
- More ...
-
The Macroeconomic Expectations of Firms
Candia, Bernardo, (2022)
-
The Inflation Expectations of U.S. Firms : Evidence from a new survey
Candia, Bernardo, (2021)
-
Tell Me Something I Don't Already Know : Learning in Low and High-Inflation Settings
Weber, Michael, (2023)
- More ...