Communication in Coordination Games.
The authors present experimental evidence on nonbinding, preplay communication in bilateral coordination games. To evaluate the effect of "cheap talk," they consider two communication structures (one-way and two-way communication) and two types of coordination games (one with a cooperative strategy and a second in which one strategy is less "risky"). In games with a cooperative strategy, one-way communication increases play of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium relative to the no communication baseline; two-way communication does not always decrease the frequency of coordination failures. In the second type of game, two-way communication always leads to the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium, while one-way communication does not. Coauthors are Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, and Thomas W. Ross. Copyright 1992, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Year of publication: |
1992
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Authors: | Cooper, Russell, et al |
Published in: |
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. - MIT Press. - Vol. 107.1992, 2, p. 739-71
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Publisher: |
MIT Press |
Saved in:
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