Communication in Federal Politics: Universalism, Policy Uniformity, and the Optimal Allocation of Fiscal Authority
The paper presents a positive model of policy formation in federal legislatures when delegates engage in the strategic exchange of policy-relevant information. Depending on the type of policy under consideration, communication between delegates generally suffers from a bias that makes truthful communication difficult and sometimes impossible. This generates inefficient federal policy choices that are often endogenously characterized by overspending, universalism, and uniformity. Building on these findings, I develop a theory of fiscal (de-)centralization, which revisits the work of Oates in a world of incomplete information and strategic communication. Empirical results from a cross section of US municipalities are consistent with the predicted pattern of spending.
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kessler, Anke S. |
Published in: |
Journal of Political Economy. - University of Chicago Press. - Vol. 122.2014, 4, p. 766-766
|
Publisher: |
University of Chicago Press |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Monitoring and Productive Efficiency in Public and Private Firms
Kessler, Anke S., (2001)
-
Interregional Redistribution and Mobility in Federations: A Positive Approach
Kessler, Anke S., (2011)
-
Interregional Redistribution and Mobility in Federations: A Positive Approach
Kessler, Anke S.,
- More ...