Communication via third parties

Jacopo Bizzotto, Eduardo Perez-Richet and Adrien Vigier

We consider a general information design problem in which the task of running a procedure generating information for a continuation game is performed by an agent. A moral hazard roblem therefore emerges in which the principal faces a trade-off between generating information with an eye to the continuation game, and incentivizing the agent to comply with the procedure designed. We provide a methodology to tackle such problems, and examine the way in which moral hazard affects the optimal procedure of the principal

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Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Bizzotto, Jacopo ; Perez-Richet, Eduardo ; Vigier, Adrien
Publisher:	[Oslo] : [Oslo Metropolitan University]
Subject:	Information Design \| Moral Hazard \| Agency Cost \| Information Acquisition \| Theorie \| Theory \| Moral hazard \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Informationsverhalten \| Information behaviour \| Informationsversorgung \| Information provision \| Informationskosten \| Information costs

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	Oslo Business School working paper. - [Oslo] : [Oslo Business School], ZDB-ID 2988256-4. - Vol. [2020, 6]
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3530804 [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012513794