Comparative Analysis of Collective Dominance

By means of tight and experienced review of mergers and adequately improved antitrust agency supervision, monopolization or abuse of dominance cases have diminished progressively both in US and EU. The focus now is on cartels and inefficient oligopolies. Cartels are not problematic as they present unarguable evidences. But for oligopolies, information asymmetry between antitrust agencies and the market participants makes the agencies suspicious about the market performance. Article 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty adopt two pronged attack on antitrust problems in oligopolies similar to the Sherman Act in US. By using the wording of quot;one or more undertakingquot; in Article 82, EU developed quot;concept of collective dominancequot;. This concept created a basis for recognizing tacitly colluding oligopolists as possessing dominant position or market power. Along a couple of cases handled in collective dominance concept, existence of quot;economic linksquot; among oligopolists evolved as a focal point for finding of collective dominance. Specifically, the paper includes a modern economic analysis of oligopoly, US and EC case law and rules regarding to collusion and oligopolies and the assessment of the collective dominance concept by means of US antitrust law, particularly by visiting Turner - Posner discussion