Comparison of Alternative Payment Mechanisms for French Treasury Auctions
Treasury auctions around the world have been typically conducted under either the uniform-price or discriminatory format. We propose alternative payment mechanisms including the uniform-price and discriminatory formats as special cases. We compare the properties of these alternative formats in the specific context of French Treasury auctions. Our results indicate that a new payment mechanism, named the "kth-average-price" auction, dominates all other formats in terms of the revenues it would raise for the French Treasury. The so-called "Spanish auction" however, is found to generate the most stable stream of revenues from one auction to the next.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | ARMANTIER, Olivier ; SBAÏ, Erwann |
Published in: |
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique. - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE). - 2009, 93-94, p. 135-160
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Publisher: |
École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE) |
Saved in:
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