Compensations as signaling devices in the political economy of reforms
Year of publication: |
2003
|
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Authors: | Castro, Ruy ; Coen-Pirani, Daniele |
Published in: |
International economic review. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0020-6598, ZDB-ID 209871-4. - Vol. 44.2003, 3, p. 1061-1078
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Subject: | Reform | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying | Kompensationsmaßnahme | Compensation measures | Signalling | Theorie | Theory |
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