Competing Teams
In many economic environments, firms compete in output markets that are not competitive, either because there is strategic interaction such as in a patent race or an oligopoly, or there are externalities such as knowledge spillovers. Very often, having skilled workers is crucial for success in these non-competitive markets. The key question in the presence of market failure is how and when the market allocation of workers to teams differs from the socially optimal allocation. Is it optimal to have the best workers together in superstar teams competing against low skilled teams, or is it better to have competition between balanced teams? Under what circumstances is the market allocation efficient? This has far-reaching implications for the optimal design of markets, ranging from research to sports competitions.
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Chade, Hector |
Institutions: | Society for Economic Dynamics - SED |
Saved in:
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