Competition and Unconscionability
This paper argues that the conventional legal doctrine that emphasizes lack of choice among suppliers or contracts as an element of unconscionability is misguided. I show that when a seller with significant market power offers only one contract, fear of alienating sophisticated customers can discourage the seller from exploiting the unsophisticated with an inefficient contract. In contrast, competitive sellers may lose money on sophisticated customers, and be willing to sacrifice them in order to exploit the unsophisticated. Likewise, offering a choice of contracts enables sellers to exploit the unsophisticated while offering an efficient contract to the sophisticated. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Friedman, Ezra |
Published in: |
American Law and Economics Review. - Oxford University Press. - Vol. 15.2013, 2, p. 443-494
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Publisher: |
Oxford University Press |
Saved in:
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