Competition between asymmetrically informed principals
Year of publication: |
1997
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bond, Eric W. |
Other Persons: | Gresik, Thomas A. (contributor) |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 10.1997, 2, p. 227-240
|
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Theorie | Theory |
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