Competition of politicians for wages and office

We examine a model in which two politicians compete for office and for wages. Their remunerations are either set by the public or are offered competitively by the candidates during campaigns. Our main finding shows that competitive wage offers by candidates lead to lower social welfare than remunerations predetermined by the public, since less competent candidates are elected or wage costs are higher.

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Gersbach, Hans
Publisher:	Heidelberg : University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Subject:	Politiker \| Leistungsentgelt \| Leistungsanreiz \| Lohn \| Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie \| Competitive wage offers \| remunerations of politicians \| elections \| free riding and under provision \| incentive contracts

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Series:	Discussion Paper Series ; 399
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	505854481 [GVK] hdl:10419/127216 [Handle]
Classification:	D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422108