Competition Policy and Cartel Size

This paper examines endogenous cartel formation in the presence of a competition authority. Competition policy is shown to make the most inclusive stable cartels less inclusive. In particular, small firms that might have been cartel members in the absence of a competition authority are no longer members. Regarding the least inclusive stable cartels, competition policy can either decrease or increase their size and, in the latter case, the collusive price can rise

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Bos, Iwan
Other Persons:	Harrington Jr, Joseph E. (contributor)
Publisher:	[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Wettbewerbspolitik \| Competition policy \| Kartell \| Cartel \| Theorie \| Theory \| Kartellrecht \| Antitrust law

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (29 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: International Economic Review, Forthcoming Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 16, 2014 erstellt
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013043493