Competition with nonexclusive contracts : tackling the hold-up problem
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Roig, Guillem |
Published in: |
The B.E. journal of theoretical economics. - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1704, ZDB-ID 2268339-2. - Vol. 20.2020, 2, p. 1-21
|
Subject: | bilateral investment | hold-up | latent contracts | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Investition | Investment | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Sunk Costs | Sunk costs | Vertrag | Contract |
-
Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? : experimental evidence
Hoppe, Eva I., (2011)
-
Formal contracts, relational contracts, and the holdup problem
Itō, Hideshi, (2006)
-
The hold-up problem in government contracting
Bös, Dieter, (1994)
- More ...
-
PRODUCT COMPATIBILITY HINDERS PRE‐EMPTIVE ADVERTISING
Roig, Guillem, (2020)
-
Collusive equilibria with switching costs : The effect of consumer concentration
Roig, Guillem, (2020)
-
The value of investment in nonexclusive contracts
Roig, Guillem, (2022)
- More ...