COMPETITIVE CREDIT MARKETS WITH MORAL HAZARD AND PERFECT SCREENING: THE INEFFICIENCY OF PROJECT SELECTION.
Year of publication: |
1990
|
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Authors: | STRAND, J. |
Institutions: | Økonomisk institutt, Universitetet i Oslo |
Subject: | competition | economic models | risk | investments | financial market |
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