Competitive prices as optimal cartel prices

In a linear oligopoly model with antitrust enforcement, the optimal cartel price converges to the competitive equilibrium price. The set of sustainable cartel prices does not shrink to the competitive price. We identify necessary conditions for this counter-intuitive convergence result.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Houba, Harold ; Motchenkova, Evgenia ; Wen, Quan
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 114.2012, 1, p. 39-42
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Antitrust enforcement \| Cartel \| Oligopoly \| Repeated game

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	L4 - Antitrust Policy ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010597211