Competitive prizes : when less scrutiny induces more effort
Year of publication: |
2001
|
---|---|
Authors: | Dubey, Pradeep ; Wu, Chien-wei |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 36.2001, 4, p. 311-336
|
Subject: | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory | Extensives Spiel | Extensive form game |
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