Complementarity in monitoring and bonding : more intense monitoring leads to higher executive compensation
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hoskisson, Robert E. ; Castleton, Mark W. ; Withers, Michael C. |
Published in: |
Academy of Management perspectives : AMP. - Briarcliff Manor, NY : Acad., ISSN 0896-3789, ZDB-ID 638493-6. - Vol. 23.2009, 2, p. 57-74
|
Subject: | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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