Complete Information Pivotal-Voter Model with Asymmetric Group Size

In this note, we characterize the equilibria of the standard pivotal-voter participation game between two groups of voters of asymmetric sizes, as originally proposed by Palfrey and Rosenthal [1983. A strategic calculus of voting. Public Choice. 41, 7-53]

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Year of publication:	2018
Authors:	Mavridis, Christos
Other Persons:	Serena, Marco (contributor)
Publisher:	[2018]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Schätzung \| Estimation \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (25 p)
Series:	Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ; No. 2018-07
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 22, 2016 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2874414 [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935191