Complete-rent-dissipation contest design
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kawamori, Tomohiko |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 232.2023, p. 1-4
|
Subject: | Contest success function | Complete rent dissipation | Observable or unobservable values | Equivalence in aggregate efforts across equilibria | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Rent-Seeking | Rent seeking |
-
Complete rent dissipation in contest with power technologies
Kawamori, Tomohiko, (2023)
-
A rent seeking experiment with leakage from the contest success function
Anderson, Lisa R., (2020)
-
Insecure resources, rent seeking, and wage inequality
Pi, Jiancai, (2019)
- More ...
-
A note on selection of proposers in coalitional bargaining
Kawamori, Tomohiko, (2008)
-
Oligopoly with a large number of competitors : asymmetric limit result
Ino, Hiroaki, (2009)
-
Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences
Kawamori, Tomohiko, (2013)
- More ...