Complete Versus Partial Collusion in Competing Coalitions
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Palsule-Desai, Omkar D. |
Published in: |
International Game Theory Review (IGTR). - World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., ISSN 1793-6675. - Vol. 17.2015, 01, p. 1540006-1
|
Publisher: |
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. |
Subject: | Coalition | competition | intensity of collusion | sharing rules | stability | game theory |
Extent: | application/pdf text/html |
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Type of publication: | Article |
Classification: | B4 - Economic Methodology ; C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods. General ; C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; M2 - Business Economics |
Source: |
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