Compromise Reaching Mechanisms in Multi-Group/Multi-Player Negotiation Processes
We consider a situation in which multiple decision-makers who are partitionedinto two or more distinct groups are asked to recommend a uniform course ofaction which is drawn from a finite and explicit set of potential alternatives.We present group-level and player-level mechanisms to reach a compromisedecision under such circumstances. The group-level mechanism is based onthe Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence; The player-level mechanism employsa set-product operation that aggregates the individual decisions over a certainspace of committees. Previous research established that the two mechanisms areisomorphic, which, in the contest of the present paper, implies that they yieldthe same compromise decision. However, unlike the Dempster-Shafer theory,which was criticized for lack of external validity, the set-product mechanismhas plausible properties in the contest of group decision making. With that inmind, the paper seeks to (i) report about an interesting relationship betweengroup decision research and AI methods to manage uncertainty, and (ii) builda foundation for an inter-disciplinary research that exploits this linkage